Noticias en el mundo del tabaco


#222

Ahora mismo BATS sube casi el 6%… parece que las restricciones al mentol y la nicotina van para largo

FDA Commission Gottlieb in a surprise move resigned today, according to an administration official, to ‘spend more time w/his family.’** Gottlieb spoke to Trump who liked him & didn’t want him to leave despite some policy disagreements he had w/the White House. The news was especially surprising given he recently hired senior staff (and was being interviewed on CNBC as recently as yesterday AM). While Gottlieb’s initiative to reduce youth vaping is expect to move forward, other initiatives inc. banning menthol or reducing nicotine levels in cigarettes are less certain now as they haven’t yet emerged from the FDA. Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2019/03/05/fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-who-raised-national-alarms-about-teenage-vaping-is-resigning


#223

Si pulsa en expediente verá quien anda detrás del registro de la marca JUUL. O al menos eso entiendo…

http://consultas2.oepm.es/ceo/jsp/busqueda/pagos/sitamar/pagosExp.xhtml


#224

No se puede comprobar nada,da error


#225

El sector del tabaco en España y otros países,lejos de quedarse obsoleto se está profesionalizando…La última novedad (promovida por imaginaros quien) es la Trazabilidad:esto es un sistema de seguimiento de todas y cada una de las cajetillas que se venden en España,desde el fabricante hasta el último vendedor de ese tabaco…va a entrar en funcionamiento en octubre.
Voy a tratar de explicarlo:
Los fabricantes fabrican el tabaco con su código de identificación,entonces desde sus fábricas mandan al almacén fiscal de España x cajones de tabaco,Logista pide para vender a los estancos lo que le haga falta,los estancos piden también lo que les haga falta y también al vendérselo a los bares para su posterior venta a través de una máquina de tabaco…el tema ahora es que cada uno de estos eslabones(menos los bares) tendrán que tener un código de identificación expedido por la real casa de la moneda para que en todo momento se sepa dónde se encuentra ese tabaco para que al final cualquier persona consumidora,por medio de una aplicación de el móvil pueda escanear el código y saber de qué estanco a salido y cuando salió y sobre todo para tener un control exhaustivo por parte de la guardia civil fiscal…
Esto que a cualquiera ajeno al sector le parecería otro palo en la rueda,pero ya os digo que está promovido por una tabaquera porque es primordial para su estrategia a largo plazo…
De momento a Logista le a costado 30 millones la adaptación y a los estancos les van a complicar un poco más el día a día pero donde manda patrón no manda marinero…
El objetivo es tener un canal de venta absolutamente riguroso con la venta de tabaco en cualquiera de sus formas para seguir creando un foso alrededor del sector…
Parecería que se fuera a vender droga jeje(antes de lo que muchos se piensan,empezarán con una variante de la mariguana sin efectos psicotropicos)
Cuando les interese a PM y MO exigirán a las autoridades correspondientes que los artículos que contengan nicotina o María se deben vender por ese canal de distribución…y ya sabéis quién manda en el canal de distribución de venta de tabaco…
Os contaría muchas cosas para el que tenga estas tabaqueras estén relajados con su inversión,pero es muy muy extenso…
Por cierto,en el medio plazo ni yo ni nadie sabe cómo se comportaran MO y PM,yo sólo escribo para que tenga confianza el que esté inseguro,de que a largo plazo son unos caballos ganadores tanto por su RPD como por su muy probable revalorización del precio de la acción.

Otra cosa …JUUL ya está reclutando gente para su comercialización y si no pasa nada lo distribuirá Logista.
Hay Logista!..una buena empresa con unos objetivos muy ambiciosos que no van a defraudar,pero eso es harina de otro costal,jeje


#226

El diablo está en los detalles…
La trazabilidad del tabaco pasa inadvertida para todo el mundo ajeno al sector pero que sepáis que tiene un propósito que tiene que ver con el cambio de paradigma hacia el que nos dirigimos y del que hablé en mensajes anteriores , un nuevo paradigma en el que van a seguir mandando los de siempre pero con mucho más beneficio que capturar para esos que mandan.


#227

Por mi parte encantado de toda la información que aporta y más viniendo de alguien que conoce este mudo desde su interior , sigo atento a lo que tenga a bien comunicarnos y gracias .


#228

Cuente, cuente…somos todo oídos


#229

Básicamente Eliquids Innovation SL (Girona), registró JUUL como nombre comercial para artículos para fumadores y tabaco. Dos meses después Jeffrey Parker and Co. reclamaron el nombre que habían registrado antes para la Unión Europea.
Y en esas están…


#230

Jijijijij,entonces el rumor tenía algo de verdad…valla tela…gracias por la aclaración!


#231

Nuevo análisis de PM en M*

PMI Backing the Right Horse, but Perpetual Investment May be Required to Drive iQOS

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Philip Gorham Updated Mar 12, 2019

After a promising start, the adoption of iQOS, Philip Morris’ heated tobacco platform, slowed materially last year, and investors are now questioning the future of the category. The slowdown should not be surprising, however, as history shows the diffusion of disruptive consumer products has rarely occurred in a straight line, with various consumer segments adopting new products at different rates. With the adoption of the first platform having plateaued at fairly low levels, however, we think more disruptive innovation is required if heated tobacco is to mitigate the impact off the decline in combustible volumes.

Of all the e-cigarette incarnations, heated tobacco products most closely replicate the smoking experience and so should attract smokers looking for a less risky alternative, so we believe that Philip Morris’ multiple premium over peers is appropriate because it has claimed a first mover advantage, at least temporarily, through the early commercialization of iQOS. However, there are still many unanswered questions about the evolution of heated tobacco. Much depends on the regulatory environment, and whether regulators publicly acknowledge that the category is safer than smoking. The FDA is expected to announce its opinion later in 2019. Margins are also a key concern. We think that with scale, heatsticks can be at least as profitable as premium cigarettes, but margins will depend heavily on the level of taxation, and our base case assumption is that heatsticks are taxed in most markets as tobacco products.

One drag on category profitability is the low margins on devices. We estimate iQOS devices generate margins of approximately 10% at full price and breakeven when on discount. It does seem likely that devices will never be as high margin as the stocks, given the likelihood of the development of a razor-and-blade model, but pipeline products such as PMI’s platform 2, the disposable heated tobacco stick branded as TEEPS, has the potential not only to avoid this profitability impediment, but also to reignite growth in a category that has caused both euphoria and disappointment amongst investors.

Economic Moat | by Philip Gorham Updated Mar 12, 2019

Philip Morris International possesses a formidable franchise in the tobacco industry, formed by the aggregation of intangible assets and a cost advantage. Tight government regulations have made barriers to entry almost insurmountable and have kept market shares stable. Consumers are quite brand-loyal, particularly in premium price segments, to which PMI’s portfolio skews, creating another intangible asset that is no longer as prevalent as it once was in other consumer categories. Finally, economies of scale give the large-cap manufacturers an advantage in tobacco leaf procurement and distribution.

Intangible Assets

Tobacco contains nicotine, an addictive substance that suppresses the cessation rate. According to data from the Tobacco Atlas, more than 60% of all smokers intend to quit, and 42% have attempted to quit over the last 12 months. Yet in most markets, the smoking rate is in only a very modest decline, implying that the majority of smokers attempting to quit fail to do so. Academic research (Lewis and others, 2015) has shown that while cessation rates are not correlated with consumer brand loyalty, premium price segments are associated at a statistically significant level with lower cessation rates. According to company disclosures, PMI has the heaviest skew to premium segment among the large-cap cigarette manufacturers, with around 55% of its OECD volumes in premium segments, benchmarked against roughly 25% for the industry in aggregate. PMI’s leading premium brands are Marlboro and Parliament.

The addictive nature of the product forms a powerful competitive advantage when combined with very tight government regulation that over the years has dampened market share volatility and competition on price. Tobacco advertising is severely restricted in most markets, with bans on most forms of mass marketing. This not only makes it very difficult for hypothetical new entrants to gain the attention of smokers, but it also dampens competition between incumbent manufacturers. Volume shares at the manufacturer level have been very stable for decades, primarily, we believe, because the lack of marketing communication has discouraged brand switching. PMI has been the only cigarette maker to increase its market share organically–by just 30 basis points–on a global basis excluding China since 2008. Marketing spending intensity varies across consumer product categories, but on average, manufacturers in more competitive categories roughly spend a high-single-digit percentage of sales on marketing. Big Tobacco manufacturers have historically spent around 1.5% of sales on advertising (although we expect next-generation products to require greater spending), with the difference accruing to the EBIT margin. Some other regulations may also have had the unintended consequence of limiting competition on price and creating a barrier to entry. Point-of-sale display bans limit manufacturers’ ability to communicate pricing, thus creating a disincentive to engage in price promotional strategies, which have historically contracted the industry profit pool. PMI makes no sales in the U.S., but FDA oversight of the U.S. has created perhaps the most clear-cut example of regulation creating insurmountable barriers to entry. The marketing of new tobacco products is subject to FDA approval, which is only granted following consideration of a request to market a new product (PMI’s ongoing application to market iQOS as a modified-risk tobacco product) or for requests made before March 2011, under the substantial equivalence test, which limits marketing approval only to products that are proven to possess similar characteristics and risk profiles to predicate products.

Despite consumer segmentation in other consumer product categories amid eroding brand loyalty, brand equity remains relevant in tobacco. This is in no small part due to the absence of challenger brands because of high regulatory barriers to entry, and because of the tight restrictions on marketing. Brand loyalty tends to be higher in premium price segments, which benefits PMI disproportionately.

Cost Advantage

Cigarette manufacturing is a scalable business model because of the homogeneity of the product, and there is an inverse correlation between volume and average operating cost per unit. In 2018, we estimate that PMI’s operating costs per pack of cigarettes and Heatsticks (after adjusting for devices) was $0.45 on volumes of 782 billion sticks. At a cable rate of 1.30, we estimate comparable costs per pack were $0.63 for Imperial Brands (in the fiscal year to Sept. 30, 2018), on less than half the volume of PMI, and $1.10 for Altria, after adjusting for the MSA payments, on volumes of just 14% that of PMI. The difference in the cost structure lies primarily at the gross margin, implying procurement advantages from scale.

Wide Versus Narrow

Though it may seem counterintuitive in a declining industry, we have conviction that our wide moat rating is appropriate because we believe PMI is very likely to continue generating excess returns on invested capital for the next 20 years. The sustainability of current levels of profitability and returns on capital depend on the positive impact of price/mix being at least in line with the annual volume decline. At some point in the future, we anticipate a tipping point at which the consumer is no longer willing to continue to accept price increases above the broader rate of inflation, leading to an increase in price elasticity. The example of Australia gives some insight into how such a kink in the demand curve might occur globally. Since 2011, a series of Draconian anti-cigarette measures in Australia have led to the introduction of plain packs and a tax increases that caused the doubling of the retail price of cigarettes in just six years, which in turn has led to the smoking rate falling from 16% to 13% over the same period, and to significant trading down between price segments. A pack of 20 cigarettes (equivalent; a standard pack contains 25 sticks in Australia) now costs roughly USD 14.50, well above the USD 10.40 average retail price in the U.K., USD 5.50 in the U.S., and USD 4.87 on average globally, according to the World Health Organization. Assuming the Australia experience is applicable to price elasticity in other markets, it appears likely that there remains a great deal of headroom for price increases globally. At 4% real pricing (based on the 6% nominal price/mix PMI has achieved over the past three years and 2% global inflation), this crude calculation suggests that it will be 2046 before global pricing reaches levels at which price elasticity increased in Australia. This is comfortably longer than 20 years, the benchmark period that we expect wide-moat companies to continue generating economic rent.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Philip Gorham Updated Mar 12, 2019

Our fair value estimate is $102, which implies forward 2020 multiples of 18 times earnings per share, 13.7 times EV/EBITDA, a free cash flow yield of 5%, and a dividend yield of 5%. These implied multiples are at the high end of both the historical trading range of the tobacco industry and our valuation of the tobacco group; we think this is justified by PMI’s advanced position in heated tobacco, which we believe has the potential to slow the industry consumption decline rate.

The overarching assumption relating to reduced-risk products in our base-case valuation is that iQOS continues to increase its share of PMI’s volume mix and that this is margin dilutive. We assume a midcycle margin of 39.7%, slightly above the 38.5% achieved last year, when currency was a headwind, but well below the 44.4% peak margin of 2012. While at scale, heatsticks look likely to be higher margin than combustible cigarettes under current favourable tax structures, we believe that in the long run, there will be equitable tax treatment of all tobacco products, which will limit the manufacturers’ margins. The customer acquisition cost is likely to be higher in the emerging categories than in cigarettes, and we assume an incremental 200 basis points of spending on research and development and advertising in our base case, versus the traditional cigarette algorithm. In the long term, further margin degradation is likely to occur from the steady decline of cigarette volumes. However, with 44 manufacturing facilities in operation, PMI has plenty of scope to cut fixed costs, which could help support margins for several years.

We assume a midcycle organic growth rate of 2.6%, with strong pricing of 4%-5% mitigated by low-single-digit volume declines. Assuming the iQOS range is marketed to existing adult smokers, it seems unlikely that volume trends would shift materially as smokers migrate to heated tobacco, so our volume decline assumption of negative 2% is similar to recent trends in the combustible business. Pricing power, however, is likely to be as strong as the combustible business, and we think 4% price/mix is appropriate, as this is consistent with the cigarette business and is stronger than most categories in consumer staples.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Philip Gorham Updated Mar 12, 2019

Our uncertainty rating for Philip Morris International is low. Evidence from the recent economic volatility suggests that industry fundamentals–and, therefore, manufacturers’ cash flows–remain stable. With pricing power intact, the greatest operational risks, in our view, are the risk of more widespread plain packaging measures in large markets and foreign exchange risk.

Any investor owning tobacco stocks should have the stomach for fat-tail risk such as the recent CAD 13 billion judgment against the industry in Quebec, Canada. Litigation risk is substantially lower for the European players, as most countries do not have a class-action legal process. Nevertheless, we regard government and legal risks as low-probability events with high potential impacts that investors should be aware of.

In general, we believe government regulation does little to affect the economic moats or the cash flows of tobacco manufacturers, and in some cases, regulation actually limits competition, lowers cost, and strengthens pricing power. Plain packaging is different, however: We believe that it could facilitate trading down, which would erode pricing power and be detrimental to moats in the industry. Australia introduced plain packs in 2012, and the U.K., Ireland, and France followed suit in 2017. If plain packages are introduced in any other major EU market, this could be materially detrimental to the firm, given its positioning in premium categories.

Philip Morris’ functional currency is the euro, but it reports in U.S. dollars. It also has exposure to currencies too small to hedge in large amounts on the open market. Although it has something of a natural hedge, with about 26% of its costs in euros almost offsetting the 32% of its revenue that is denominated in euros, strength in the U.S. dollar can have a significant and detrimental impact on Philip Morris’ earnings, and this risk has been evident in recent years.

Stewardship | by Philip Gorham Updated Mar 12, 2019

Our stewardship rating for Philip Morris International is Exemplary. We think that the capital allocation of the business has been commendable and that the business is being run for the long-term benefit of shareholders.

PMI’s recent shareholder return performance has been outstanding, with at least 9% annualized returns each year over the past three years. Although the five-year return looks less appealing, returns were weighed down by the removal of the share-repurchase program and currency weighing on operating performance. Management is sometimes criticized for the aggressive nature with which it repurchased shares following the split from Altria in 2008, but given the trajectory of the market capitalization in recent years, it is clear that the buybacks created value for long-term shareholders. We understand that management is prioritizing the maintenance of its investment-grade credit ratings, but we think the recent weakness in the market value of the company presents an opportunity to create further value share repurchases.

Since the rotation of some senior executives, most notably Louis Camilleri stepping aside as CEO in May 2013 and being replaced by former COO Andre Calantzopoulos, we think capital allocation has continued to be sound. Share repurchases have been suspended, a decision that we think was prudent given the strength of the currency headwind. We prefer that free cash flow be allocated to increasing the dividend, a policy management has pursued despite the temporary inflation in the payout ratio, albeit at a slower pace than we think the company can achieve in the medium term. Share repurchases are likely to return when currency headwinds abate and the payout ratio returns to a normalized level in the mid-80s.

The advent of e-cigarettes is presenting the tobacco industry with its greatest upheaval in a generation, and amid this challenge, we believe Philip Morris has allocated internal capital in an effective manner. Management has made a big bet on heated tobacco, having built a $2 billion plant in Bologna, Italy, and taking an industry-leading role in taking the category to market. The heated tobacco category better matches smokers’ preferences than other e-cigarette categories, in our opinion, and we think this will lead to greater consumer adoption. Philip Morris’ investment in iQOS, therefore, gives it early leadership of the category and sets the firm up well for long-term growth.


#232

San Francisco officials look to ban e-cigarettes

Altria is lower after officials in San Francisco proposed legislation to ban the sale of e-cigarettes in the city.


#233

Os dejo tres diapositivas sacadas de la presentación a inversores de British American Tobacco que reflejan una consolidación del sector del Vapeo. El incremento de la regulación hace que los productos de vapeo se terminen vendiendo en los canales de venta tradicional (estancos) lo cual acaba beneficiando a las tabacaleras.

consolidaci%C3%B3n


#234

Nuevo Iqos de PM


#235

“The underlying strength of our combustible tobacco business remains intact, and there is the unprecedented opportunity for reduced-
risk products to accelerate business growth and generously reward shareholders. Our transformation to a smoke-free future allows us
to play a pivotal role in improving the lives of adult smokers, while securing the long-term future of our company and the sustainability of our earnings and dividend growth for years to come”

PMI Annual Report


#236

Hola a todos

Tengo acciones de Philpis Morris en degiro y he visto que van a dar un dividendo; sin embargo la parte de retención del futuro dividendo es del 15%. Según leí en el libro de David Blanco Galisteo, la retención era mucho menor. ¿Alguno de vosotros estáis en la misma situación?

Gracias


#237

Puede que tenga usted en mente la devolución que le puede hacer, si así lo solicita, la hacienda española. En todo caso, tengo entendido que el dinero que le devuelvan es de la parte que tributa en España. El 15% es “impepinable”


#238

Ese 15% de retención es de la Hacienda de los EE.UU, y según el mencionado libro, las empresas que generan más del 80% de los beneficios fuera de los EE.UU solo tributa por las ganancias en los EE,UU, y el resto está libre de tributar, por lo que al final se tributa menos del 15%; pero a mi Degiro me ha retenido el 15%


#239

El año pasado en IB las retenciones para PM, han sido del 0,4% aprox.


#240

Pues es una casuística que desconocía. Mandamos un email?

Ya he mandado un email a Degiro.

https://www.pmi.com/investor-relations/faq aquí se puede ver que efectivamente tiene usted mas razón que un santo @valueinvestor


#241

Cabe la posibilidad que su broker le aplique un 0% sobre el grueso de los dividendos (el 98% del dividendo) y un 15% (30% si no tiene cumplimentado W-8BEN) al 2% restante que es el que está sujeto a retención en USA.

Si la retención es sobre el total del dividendo yo reclamaría a su broker.