Hilo de Inditex


#82

Si sigue bajando compro más acciones


#83

En mi opinión todo lo que está pasando es coyuntural. Poco frío en otoño, tipos de cambio que le han desfavorecido y poco más. A mí lo que Inditex plantea para 2020,llegar a todos los países del mundo de forma online me parece increíble.


#84

Inditex, REE y Enagás un trío indispensable.

Del Ibex se empiezan a poner interesantes Viscofán y Amadeus, Y queda AENA que me empieza a despertar mi curiosidad.


#85

Grifols ,Airbus,Bayer…no se pueden desdeñar,tambien.


#86

-4.4%
A 22.80 me tienta


#87

Nadie sabe el suelo de una cotización pero podría ser una buena compra.


#88

igual espero por si baja mas 20-22


#89

Lo que es seguir al rebaño.

El año anterior confiaba todo el mundo en su crecimiento y ahora de repente ya dicen que es madura.
Se lleva sabiendo años que es madura en Europa y pequeña fuera pero los analistas para no quedar expuestos muchas veces no se mojan y prefieren mantener posición defensiva.
¿Tanto ha cambiado Inditex en un año?


#90

Ha cerrado a 22.66
Igual mañana caen…


#91

A mí me ha cogido por sorpresa está caída, creo que es una buena empresa la llevo a 24€.


Os dejo un análisis de los últimos resultados, soy novel en este mundo pero me cuesta creer en la caída que lleva.


#92

En el caso de Inditex es auténtico lo que dice Amancio, su empresa necesita crecer continuadamente para que su modelo de negocio funcione y sus ratios de rentabilidad se mantengan.

Inditex opera con WC (capital circulante operativo) negativo gracias a su financiacion mediante sus proveedores que se amplifica cuanto mayores son las ventas. EL problema es que una contracción de sus ventas durante los suficientes trimestres tendría el efecto contrario. Y alguno dirá, sí, pero seguirá ganando mucho dinero, y sí, seguro que es así, pero miren H&M y el batacazo bursatil que se ha comido su accionista hasta que se ha empezado a recuperar. La contracción de los múltiplos de rentabilidad y beneficio sería muy grande en ese caso propiciando una cogotazo guapo, y me temo que es lo que las cotizaciones están ahora “mostrando”, si es que una cotización muestra algo

Salut


#93

Con Inditex siempre me viene a la mente las palabras de Álvaro Guzmán de Lázaro: sus grandes errores de inversión siempre han sido en el retail, la deuda o la disrupción y recomendaba pensarlo muy bien antes de entrar en esos sectores


#94

El retail es tough…EMHO.
Primero viene el batacazo.
Después,los ajustes.
A continuación las explicaciones.
Y cuando te das cuenta tienes 1 cortefiel (por decir algo y la gente no entra en tus tiendas).
Claro…si vienes de multiplos de 30 veces…o más, la cosa se complica.

Y ojo, que ITX es una empresa muy bien gestionada.


#95

Todo lo que habéis comentado es cierto @lafinta @El_tijeritas @quixote1. Es un sector complicado. De todas formas para mi Inditex es la mejor empresa y tiene un modelo que hoy por hoy sus competidores no pueden imitar. A mí que caiga en bolsa me da exactamente lo mismo. Inditex de momento es un reloj. Pocas empresas conozco que lleven 40 años creciendo y dando beneficios sin fallar ni un solo año.

¿Qué ha pasado para tanta novedad? ¿El ultrafast fashion? ¿El eCommerce? ¿Amazon?

Inditex es un monstruo de 8 cabezas (Zara, Breska, Massimo Dutti…) De momento creo que no le han cortado ninguna.


#96

ITX según mi Jelena Sokolova de Morningstar:

Inditex Decently Weathers Weather Condition Challenges in 3Q. Shares Attractive

Analyst Note | by Jelena Sokolova Updated Dec 12, 2018

We maintain our fair value of EUR 31 per share, as Inditex delivered third-quarter results, negatively affected by late start of the season. We now forecast somewhat weaker full-year sales but better margins, which has offsetting impact on our fair value estimate. We view shares as attractive at current levels.

Like for like in the period from August to end of November grew by 3%, which was lighter than 4% growth in first-half 2018 and 4%-6% like-for-like guidance for the second half of the year (which was maintained). Following weak September with unseasonably warm weather across major markets, like-for-like improved to 5% in October and November. Inditex opted not to participate in promotional environment, which spread wide in the industry in the quarter. This decision resulted in strong gross margin development–gross margin improved to 58% in the first nine months of 2018 versus 57.4% a year ago with notably strong 110 basis points improvement in the third quarter. Operating leverage was positive, but operating margin improvement was dampened by negative currency impact.

Although like-for-like development was slightly below the lower bound of management’s guidance so far, we don’t see higher risk of discounting into the fourth quarter as inventory situation remained healthy (inventories grew 3% year on year, in line with revenue development in the first nine months). We believe Inditex remains strongly positioned among its peers to adjust quickly to the changes in demand and weather patterns through its fast supply chain and should continue gaining market share. We don’t change our long-term forecasts for largely flat gross margin, as we believe that in a highly competitive apparel space, Inditex would have to reinvest in its quality/value proposition to remain ahead of the competition.

Business Strategy and Outlook | by Jelena Sokolova Updated Jun 25, 2018

Inditex is one of the leaders in fast fashion, having developed a unique business model that delivers up-to-the-minute fashions with frequent inventory turnover at affordable prices. Its cost advantages and brand intangible assets are the basis of our narrow moat rating.

We believe the company’s model is defensible from outside competition, as the secret to its success lies in its centralised operations, feedback loop, and scale. About 60% of Inditex’s manufacturing is carried out by suppliers in Spain’s vicinity, and distribution centres are centralised in Spain. Shipments are made to all stores worldwide twice a week, and stores receive orders in 24-48 hours. We believe this frequent replenishment model allows the company to be more responsive to immediate trends and achieve better sell-through at full price. Although many traditional retailers are striving to achieve these faster inventory turns, few have succeeded, given the unique logistical structure. Operating margins are thus significantly higher than traditional competition, totalling 17% in fiscal 2017 versus 9% at Gap. New entrants trying to replicate Inditex’s business model would start at a significant production/distribution cost disadvantage and need for marketing expenses (which Inditex’s Zara doesn’t incur). Thus, they are unlikely to match Inditex’s fashion quality/price proposition.

We believe that Inditex’s brands should continue to take market share from the incumbent weaker players (midpriced specialty brands, nonspecialty players, and department stores) as they have in the past. Our model calls for 3% space growth, 3% in-store comparable sales growth, and 21% online business growth over the next decade. This would bring Inditex’s market share of global apparel industry from 2% currently to 3.7% in 2027. We expect gross margins to remain stable (as scale benefits are recycled into the customer proposition) and operating margins to improve over time to 18.3% (from 17% currently) as expansionary investments moderate and the company grows increasingly off the same store base.

Economic Moat | by Jelena Sokolova Updated Jun 25, 2018

We believe Inditex benefits from a narrow moat arising from its cost advantages and, to a lesser extent, intangible assets. We believe Inditex’s cost advantage–arising from production scale, a fast supply chain, and design feedback loop, in combination with strong brand recognition and prime store locations–will allow the company to generate excess returns over a 10-year time horizon. Excess returns over a 20-year time horizon are less obvious, as scale, supply-chain organisation, and brand recognition could be matched by potential new entrants or incumbent competition over a sufficiently long time frame.

We believe Inditex’s cost advantage arises from design and supply-chain organisation that allows it to maximise full-price sell through and minimise discounts. This results in gross margins higher than most peers (56% gross margins versus a 46% peer average), despite comparable product prices. Inventory is managed centrally and shipped to all store locations by airplane within 48 hours. In contrast, in a traditional offshored manufacturing configuration, clothes are shipped from Asia to Europe by sea significantly more rarely and in bulk to optimise transportation cost, which takes about three to four weeks. Store assortment is refreshed twice a week (versus four times per year in the traditional apparel industry configuration), and strongly performing styles are usually not repeated, which incentivises frequent customer visits and purchases. Since production is small-batch with a wide variety of designs (50,000 new designs per year), nonperforming styles can be discontinued without a significant adverse impact on revenue. Store personnel provides regular feedback to the design teams, which is used as an input in the design process. Additionally, Inditex’s size allows purchasing power with its suppliers, which its smaller peers don’t enjoy (Inditex is the biggest customer of many of its suppliers and prefers to grow with existing suppliers rather than adding new ones). Thanks to Inditex’s centralised business model, many of the fixed costs associated with international expansion are avoided, including distribution centres and head-office management.

Although many incumbent players have attempted to replicate some parts of Inditex’s business model and speed up the supply chain, the results have been subpar (for example, GAP targeted to reduce supply-chain lead times from six months to three months in 2014, but failed to deliver on the target), as those require significant changes in the company’s operations and culture and can be risky. Changes would need to be made in how the design process works (from creative push to information-based pull), relationships with proximity suppliers would have to be established, reporting structures across the organisation would have to be changed, and a shift to fully retail operations would be needed. More importantly, however, such business model changes present a risk of alienating the existing brand-loyal consumer, while not gaining acceptance from the more fashion-conscious new one. Significant marketing expenses would also need to be incurred to communicate the change in brand direction (while consumers know what Zara stands for). Finally, most incumbent peers lack Inditex’s scale (enabled by its EUR 25 billion in revenue and 7,000-plus stores), operate at lower margins, and have less financial headroom for investments (for example, GAP and Fast Retailing have operating margins in the high single/low double digits, and revenue of EUR 10 billion-EUR 15 billion).

We believe that the smaller, emerging competitors trying to replicate Zara’s business model would start at a significant cost disadvantage versus Inditex, given that they don’t benefit from the company’s scale and will incur marketing costs to make themselves known (which Zara doesn’t need to do, given its brand recognition, prime locations, and zero marketing budget). Thus, it is unlikely that they will be able to offer the same high fashion content and product quality for prices comparable to those at Zara.

We don’t believe that a recognised brand guarantees pricing power in the general apparel space versus luxury goods, where brand choice helps communicate the financial status of the wearer and sometimes provides storage of value.

Our view is supported by a few cases of market share losses and margin erosion for companies with strong globally or locally known brands, with recent examples including Gap, Abercrombie & Fitch, and Esprit, as well as general industry price deflation (the global apparel industry has expanded by around 3% in terms of volumes but only 1% in terms of value annually over the past five years, according to Euromonitor). Consumers are also getting increasingly less brand-loyal and more price-sensitive, as some studies show. For example, among millennials, two thirds say they are willing to switch brands for a discount of 30% or more, according to the 2018 McKinsey The State of Fashion report.

Nonetheless, we believe that globally known brands such as Zara enable Inditex to enter new markets without additional brand investment. The Zara brand doesn’t have advertising budget, a feat not many companies in the fragmented apparel industry can afford. Additionally, Inditex’s real estate portfolio, with its high share of prime locations, acts as a good brand display (Inditex’s brands’ store base comprises a mix of prime and department store locations). Locations on luxury main streets and elevated store design despite significantly lower prices play to Zara’s brand advantage, while boosting customer traffic.

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Jelena Sokolova Updated Dec 12, 2018

We maintain our fair value estimate for Inditex at EUR 31. Our valuation implies 2018 adjusted earnings multiple of 26.6 and 2018 adjusted enterprise value/EBITDA of 15.7.

We forecast 8% annual revenue growth over the next decade (versus 10.4% over the past decade), driven by 2%-4% store space additions, 3% growth in store comparable sales, and 21% annual growth in Inditex’s online business, as new online markets are added, and more customer purchases shift online. We also expect somewhat higher growth for smaller brands in the group, which together account for 40% of revenue and target slightly different income and demographic groups (for example, Massimo Dutti and Uterque for a more affluent older customer, and Stradivarius and Bershka for a younger consumer). We expect Inditex to continue taking market share from slower, midpriced specialty competition, and we see its global market share increasing from 2% currently to 3.7% in a decade.

We expect gross margin to be stable, as scale benefits are likely to be passed on to the consumer, given the increased industry competitiveness. Nonetheless, we expect operating margins to expand gradually from 17% currently to 18.43% by 2027 through operating efficiencies and less capital-intensive growth (as store-base growth slows and online operations mature). This is slightly below our prior forecast of 18.7%. We expect capital expenditures to decline over time as a percentage of sales to below 5% from 7%-8% on average over the past five years, as store space expansion moderates. We expect investments to be channelled towards e-commerce developments in new markets (e-commerce is currently available in around half of markets where the firm is present), some store openings in global prime locations, and existing store refurbishments.

Risk and Uncertainty | by Jelena Sokolova Updated Jun 25, 2018

High-fashion apparel retail is a very volatile industry, depending upon the ability to correctly predict global fashion trends, levels of consumer confidence, apparel category demand, and employment and payroll growth. Although we think Inditex’s pull-based model of manufacturing with frequent shipments and a feedback loop with stores hedges some of this risk, the risk is still inherent in the model. Much of Inditex’s design and manufacturing occurs near its headquarters in Spain. We think this is key to the success of the business model, but it also exposes the company to undiversified regional risk. This could include factors such as wages, regulations, taxes, and disasters. A significant amount of top-line growth is driven through new space growth. We think the company is successful at managing this growth, but this pace could lead to sales cannibalisation, difficulty finding appropriate real estate, or difficulty managing such a large and complex store base. Also, at some point, the growth of Zara stores will have to decelerate, and there is risk attached to the success of the other seven brands as these become a larger proportion of the portfolio.

Stewardship | by Jelena Sokolova Updated Jun 25, 2018

We are maintaining our Standard stewardship rating for Inditex. The board of directors is composed of the chairman and CEO, founder, deputy chairman, and six ordinary members. Amancio Ortega Gaona, cofounder of Inditex, owns 59% of the shares. We think his presence is very valuable, given his experience with the company and the fact that his interests are well aligned with shareholders with his large share interest.

Pablo Isla is chairman and CEO. He was appointed deputy chairman and CEO in 2005.

We believe that management can be credited for timely online investments, as well as integrating Inditex’s offline store base with online business in an optimal way. For instance, in-store delivery and returns of online purchases (one-third of online orders are received in-store and two thirds are returned in store) reduce delivery costs and encourage customers to check out in-store assortment. Online order fulfilment from the store’s inventory (currently in implementation) should allow to shorten product delivery times in a way few pure-play online players can, improving online conversion rates. Further, this should help boost full price sell-through, as in-store assortment is available to a wider audience. Additionally, RFID implementation (2013-15) allowed better inventory oversight and an even faster supply chain (faster product counting, authentication, and delivery, showcasing management execution of strategy).

We also believe that management’s target to keep gross margins flat (+/- 50 basis points) is a smart one, as accruing scale benefits are reinvested in the customer value proposition, further cementing Inditex’s competitive advantage against peers in a highly competitive apparel industry.

While store base expansion has not historically come at the expense of sales density, space growth targets of 4%-6% may prove ambitious, given the already large store base and the continuing shift to online buying.

Inditex has done a good job of balancing reinvesting in the business and returning cash to shareholders. Dividend per share has increased by 13.6% annually over the past five years, while being well covered by the free cash flow.


#97

Dice cosas muy coherentes esta Jelena Sokolova. Me quedo con lo siguiente.
En 10 años Inditex tiene un foso que va a ser muy difícil superar por sus competidores. En 20 años quién sabe.

Todo el mundo en el sector está intentando seguir el modelo de Inditex en menor o mayor medida. Tanto los competidores de siempre, H&M o Uniqlo. Como los nuevos que están entrando (Asos, Zalando…)

Esto que parece tan fácil les va a llevar muchos años. A mi de hecho diez años se me antoja demasiado poco. Si es que lo consiguen claro.

En unos casos (H&M, Uniqlo) no tienen las fabricas ni el modelo de negocio apropiado para hacerlo. Tendrían que variar complemente todo: software, logística… Hasta tienen que formar a las personas que atienden en las tiendas. En fin un lió.

En el otro (Asos, Zalando) no tienen escala, ni tiendas físicas ni otras cosas que si tiene Inditex.


#98

Cómo decía un conocido inversor value. Hay que analizar una empresa para ver como puede ser destruida.Pues en el caso de Inditex no encuentro la fisura para meterle mano.


#99

Cuestión de precio…Inditex a día de hoy a per 16 o 17 es comprable a per 22 está cara. Es mi modesta opinion.


#100

Yo hago como Peter Lynch, sigo viendo tiendas llenas y mi mujer e hija siguen siendo clientas bastante fieles a la marca.


#101

A mi me impresiono mucho el online que tiene. Es que tener todo integrado hasta hace que funcione mejor el online. El cuidado por los detalles quie tienen en todo.

Inditex siempre me ha generado mucha admiración pero durante mucho tiempo he sido escéptico. El retail es un sector difícil. Hasta que un día me dije vamos a estudiarla a fondo. Me puse a leer mucho sobre ella y hoy por hoy es una empresa que me genera una seguridad muy alta a la hora de invertir e incluso de ir acumulando acciones con el paso del tiempo.

Me pasa un poco como con Nike. Mucha gente dice que quizás no sea una empresa tan sólida como otras. Pero una vez que la has analizado a fondo, que has leído mucho sobre la empresa, la conclusión a la que llegas es que en 10 años tiene todo tan bien montado para que el negocio funcione tan bien como lo hace hoy en día.

Es decir, la visibilidad que me generan Nike e Inditex de aquí a 10 años es elevadísima.